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Tell Us about the Recent Investment Boom and Bust
Jonathan McCarthy
A study of capital expenditure trends identifies investment in information technology as a major
factor in the 1990s boom and subsequent bust. Spending on computers and software, fueled by
Y2K preparations and the rise of the Internet, drove investment growth in the late 1990s but
slowed in 2000, while overly optimistic profit expectations by communications industries likely
prompted an unsustainable investment surge in 2000.
A
notable feature of the long economic
expansion of the 1990s was the exceptional
strength of business investment in equip-
ment and software.In mid-2000,however,expenditures of
investment capital began a marked decline that continued
through the first half of 2002.Although these expenditures
subsequently rebounded modestly,the reduction in invest-
ment,particularly in information technology,was a major
factor behind the 2001 recession and the subsequent slow
growth.1
This edition of Current Issues takes an in-depth look at
the role played by capital expenditure patterns in the recent
investment boom and bust.Specifically,we analyze spend-
ing trends across types of equipment and industries.
Special attention is paid to the communications indus-
tries—telephone and telegraph,and radio and television—
whose unique investment behavior around the end of the
boom was singled out by many observers.2 Putting our
analysis into a broader context,we also examine investment
patterns more generally to determine whether the 2001
bust was spurred by firms’excessive optimism about their
profit prospects during the boom. Such overexuberance
may have led to capital overhangs among these firms—
capital levels greater than what is needed for economically
efficient production—which may have had a negative effect
on their investment activity.
We find that investment trends in the communications
industries indeed had a disproportionate effect—in rela-
tion to the industries’share of the overall economy—on
both the end of the boom in 2000 and the onset of the bust
in 2001. Significantly, investment by these industries in
2000 likely reflected a severe misperception of future
returns.For example,real returns in the telephone indus-
try,by our calculations,would have had to be more than
twice their “normal”levels to justify the investment rate
that year.
We also find, more broadly, that the higher investing
industries of the late 1990s tended to reduce their invest-
ment rate more in 2001. This pattern likely reflects two
complementary factors underlying the depth of the invest-
ment bust:the presence of capital overhangs attributable to
the boom and a reassessment by firms of future expected
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clude that the 2001 investment bust—and possibly the
recession—likely stemmed in part from firms’ excessive
optimism of the late 1990s.
The Recent Investment Boom and Bust
The investment boom of the 1990s was distinguished by its
persistence. During most of the decade, expenditures on
equipment and software grew at double-digit rates after lan-
guishing during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Chart 1).
Although the 1970s and early 1980s saw episodes of higher
investment growth rates,the persistently high growth of the
1990s expansion was unique over the past thirty years.
To put the 1990s investment boom in historical perspec-
tive,we examine investment growth rates for overlapping
ten-year periods back to 1911 (Chart 2).The growth rate in
equipment spending in the ten years through 2000 was
nearly 10 percent.This rate was exceeded only in ten-year
periods that included major wars: periods ending in 1918
(World War I),the late 1940s (World War II),and the early
1950s (World War II and the Korean War).In addition,the
investment growth rates of the 1990s easily topped those of
the 1920s,a decade of notable innovations associated with
rapid appreciation in equity prices.
In the second halfof2000,the boom ended abruptly.Year-
over-year investment growth turned sharply negative in the
first half of 2001,reaching lows not seen since the severe
recessions of 1973-75 and 1981-82 (Chart 1).It is not sur-
prising,then,that this abrupt,large,and relatively persistent
decline in investment at the start of the last recession led
many analysts to point to overinvestment as a primary con-
tributor to the downturn.3
The boom also had a profound effect on the capital stock.
Although investment spending focused heavily on comput-
ers and software—products that depreciate at a fast rate—
the strong investment climate of the late 1990s resulted in
the rapid growth of the real stock of equipment and software
during this period.Capital stock increased nearly 7 percent
per year from 1998 to 2000 after rising only less than 2 per-
cent in the late 1980s.4 This strong growth,particularly in
high-tech equipment and software, has been cited as an
important factor in the rise of trend productivity growth
rates going back to 1995.5 Moreover, while investment
spending declined in 2001,the capital stock still grew nearly
4 percent that year—a rate well above the prevailing rates of
the 1980s.
Investment Patterns across Equipment Types
To analyze investment growth in the 1990s,we first identify
the types of equipment that attracted the most spending
during the period.We then investigate whether the reduc-
tions in investment during the bust occurred in these same
types of equipment.For this exercise,we use as our measure
the contributions to the growth of overall investment—
roughly,the growth of a component multiplied by its share of
investment6—from four major types of equipment: infor-
mation equipment and software, industrial equipment,
transportation equipment,and “other”equipment.7
Among these types of equipment,information equipment
and software played the largest role in the investment fluctu-
ations of the late 1990s through the early 2000s (see table).
In the boom years of the late 1990s,the share of investment
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6
2
Chart 1
Nonresidential Investment in Equipment and Software
Year-over-Year Growth
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
Haver Analytics. 
Note: The shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions 
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Chart 2
Ten-Year Investment Growth Rates
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growth attributable to information equipment was about
two-thirds.This share was even larger in the slower growth
years of 2000 and 2002.In fact,the growth contribution of
information equipment was larger than the investment
growth of total equipment in each of these years,indicating
that expenditures on other equipment fell.In the bust year of
2001, the decline in spending on information equipment
accounted for more than half of the fall in overall equipment
spending.
Within information equipment,a shift occurred in the
1998-2002 period in the types of equipment that led invest-
ment growth.Computers and software were the major con-
tributors to the boom in the late 1990s.In 1998 and 1999,
these two categories accounted for about half of the high
capital spending growth of the period, even though their
share of investment was less than 30 percent.8 At the time,
Y2K preparations and the Internet boom were large factors
behind the robustness of these expenditures.However,in
2000, with Y2K having passed and the Internet bubble
beginning to deflate,spending on computers and software
slowed significantly,and the growth contributions of the two
categories amounted to just half of their 1999 levels.
In 2000,communications equipment became the major
driver of investment spending.It contributed almost 3 per-
centage points to investment growth—well more than half
of the investment growth that year—whereas its share of
investment was slightly more than 12 percent.This growth
contribution from communications equipment was the
highest since the recovery from the 1973-75 recession,and it
appeared to stem from deregulation, the proliferation of
wireless communications,and the Internet boom and asso-
ciated investments in broadband Internet connections.
Communications equipment had a similarly large role in
the bust of 2001,adding nearly 4 percentage points to the
decline in investment one year after making a sizable contri-
bution to growth.This swing reflects the dramatic change in
the financial condition of the industry:in 2000,communica-
tions had booming stock prices and seemingly great
prospects,but by 2001,it was facing the woes of overbur-
dened balance sheets from license overpayments on wireless
broadcasting spectra as well as a large surplus of capital
stock with little immediate prospect of positive returns.
Spending on high-tech equipment—computers,software,
and communications equipment—certainly received the
most attention during the boom,but the strength of high-
tech and the health of the overall economy also appeared to
spill over into low-tech equipment.In particular,growth in
transportation equipment was robust during the late 1990s,
reflecting the rapid expansion of trucking companies and
airlines to satisfy the increasing demand for shipping and
travel services.As one might expect,spending on low-tech
equipment—especially industrial equipment—also shrank
during the bust.9
Finally,the disproportionate role of equipment expendi-
tures in GDP fluctuations during this period merits consid-
eration.In the boom years,these expenditures accounted for
a share of GDP growth that was much larger than their share
of nominal GDP.In the investment bust,the role was even
more pronounced: the negative GDP growth contribution
from equipment expenditures was a major factor restraining
GDP growth to a minimal level in 2001.
Effects of the Investment Boom and Bust 
across Equipment Types
Percent Except as Noted
Category 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Equipment and software 
growth (fourth quarter 




and software 9.4 6.6 5.8 -4.9 4.1
Computers and 
peripherals 4.2 2.6 1.6 -0.4 1.9
Software 3.2 2.5 1.0 -0.5 1.1
Communications 
equipment 1.9 1.6 2.9 -3.9 0.2
Other information
equipment 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.9
Industrial equipment 0.2 0.7 1.5 -2.1 0.1
Transportation
equipment 4.1 1.9 -2.7 -0.8 -1.7
Other equipment 1.3 0.3 0.6 -0.9 0.8
Memo:
Real GDP growth (fourth
quarter to fourth quarter) 4.8 4.3 2.3 0.1 2.9
GDP growth contribution 
of equipment and software
(percentage points) 1.3 0.9 0.5 -0.8 0.3
GDP growth share of
equipment and software 27.5 21.1 22.2 N.A. 9.1
Nominal GDP share 
of equipment and software 9.3 9.6 9.7 8.7 8.1
Sources:U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of Economic Analysis;
Haver Analytics;author’s calculations.
Note:Growth contributions do not necessarily sum to totals because of rounding.One could conclude that the 2001 recession most likely
would have been milder had the investment bust not
occurred.Despite the evidence that the investment bust was
influential,aggregate studies of the bust,such as McCarthy
(2001,2003) and Kliesen (2003),have been unable to iden-
tify its source.This inability,combined with the importance
of equipment expenditures in recent economic fluctuations,
suggests that an examination ofcapital spending by industry
could provide new insight into the sources of the investment
bust and thus the recent recession.
Investment Patterns across Industries
Communications Industries
Communications equipment played a key role both at the
end of the investment boom and during the bust.
Accordingly,we begin our examination of capital spending
by industry by focusing on the two communications indus-
tries: telephone and telegraph (telephone hereafter) and
radio and television (radio-TV hereafter).These industries
are the primary users of communications equipment,
accounting for more than half of total investment spending
on this category.
It should thus come as no surprise that developments in
the telephone and radio-TV industries were indicative of
overall trends in the communications equipment boom and
bust (Chart 3).10 Using the standard economic measure of
investment intensity—the investment rate, or ratio of
investment to capital stock—we find that through the 1980s
and mid-1990s,the investment rate of the telephone indus-
try fluctuated between 15 and 20 percent.Yet in 2000,the
industry experienced a surge in capital spending that
resulted in an investment rate of almost 33 percent—the
highest since 1948.Moreover,despite the dramatic reversal
in 2001,the industry investment rate still exceeded its 1970-98
average. The surge in capital spending by the radio-TV
industry occurred earlier than it did in the telephone indus-
try,but the general patterns of the two industries are similar.
The telephone industry is especially noteworthy because
it already had a large capital base and was relatively
mature—industry characteristics usually not associated
with investment surges. One possible explanation for the
heightened investment by the telephone industry is that
recent developments in telecommunications technologies—
in particular,the Internet and wireless booms—increased
the industry’s perceived profit potential,which encouraged
more investment in capital goods.
However, using a standard economic model of invest-
ment,we calculate that the telephone industry would have
required an extraordinary increase in profit potential to have
justified such investment.To illustrate,we assume that real
profits in the industry were rising 3.5 percent per year before
the investment surge,equipment capital was depreciating at
a rate of 15 percent per year,and capital goods prices were
declining 5 percent per year—assumptions that were all
consistent with the experience of the telephone industry
before the late 1990s.If these assumptions are accurate,then
the rise of the investment rate from 18 percent (the 1970-96
average) to 33 percent (the 2001 level) implies that real prof-
its in the telephone industry were expected to increase
between 8.7 and 10.1 percent per year afterward,the precise
rate varying with the cost of adjusting the capital base.11
Such an increase in profit growth would indeed seem extra-
ordinary in such a mature industry.
This result implies that the 1999-2000 investment boom
in the communications industries reflects an overly opti-
mistic view of the profit prospects of new technologies.Such
optimism may have fueled the bust by leading to overinvest-
ment and capital overhangs.12To investigate this hypothesis,
we examine whether a general pattern of overinvestment
and overhangs existed across industries.Specifically,we ana-
lyze the relationship between previous industry investment
patterns and changes in investment rates across industries.
General Industry Investment Patterns
Did the investment boom and bust center in industries that
had high investment rates? In terms of the boom,such a pat-
tern could suggest a “momentum”scenario,in which high-
investment industries were continuing to invest even more.
Conversely, a pattern in which low-investment industries
began to invest much more heavily could suggest that these
industries were attempting to “catch up.”
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Chart 3
Equipment and Software Investment Rates 
of the Communications Industries
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
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An industry comparison of the change in the investment
rate in 1997-98 with the average rate over the previous five
years uncovers neither of these patterns (Chart 4).13 Most 
of the industries we examine (thirty-eight of fifty-four)
increased their investment rates between 1997 and 1998:
these industries include ones with high investment rates
during 1993-97 as well as ones with low investment rates.14
Moreover,among the industries that reduced their invest-
ment rates between 1997 and 1998 there is a comparable
diversity of prior investment rates.Thus,the rise in invest-
ment rates during the boom was likely a general phenome-
non rather than an example of traditionally high-investment
industries investing even more or low-investment industries
trying to catch up.This finding suggests that broad macro-
economic factors—including the strong economic growth
during the period—were major contributors to the boom.15
In contrast,a definite industry pattern emerges during
the bust of 2001.A similar comparison—in this case,the
change in the investment rate in 2000-01 with the average
investment rate over the previous five years—reveals a clear
negative relationship,shown by the estimated trend line in
Chart 5.16With the exception of a few examples of extreme
investment reduction, particularly in the telephone and
radio-TV industries, most industries land near the trend
line.This result suggests that the relationship is not domi-
nated by a few special cases,but reflects a general pattern of
investment reduction across industries.
This pattern during the bust may reflect two possibly
complementary scenarios.17 The first is that many of the
high-investment industries during the boom may have
become too optimistic and thus overinvested.Consequently,
they developed capital overhangs and began to correct them
during the 2001 recession by curtailing investment. The
communications industries appear to be an extreme case of
this behavior. This interpretation is in contrast with the
aggregate analysis of McCarthy (2003),who finds a modest
overhang of aggregate capital in 2000-01.Therefore,this dis-
aggregated analysis may reconcile the modest aggregate 
capital overhang with the severe correction in investment
that took place during the bust.
In the second scenario,the more cyclical industries may
have reassessed their growth prospects in light of the reces-
sion,determined that their outlook was too optimistic,and
thus reduced investment. Preliminary work on our part,
however,does not provide much support for this conclusion.
Contrary to what our time-series evidence reveals,we find
little relationship between GDP growth and investment rates
across industries.18 Nevertheless,the evidence still does not
preclude the second scenario.During recessions,firms typi-
cally reassess their profit prospects.Ifthey did so in the most
recent downturn,then the reassessments of future growth
could explain the relationship observed between changes in
investment in 2001 and previous investment rates.
To differentiate further between these two scenarios
would require a more technical analysis than we can provide
here.Still,the ultimate effects of the two scenarios—over-
investment and growth reassessment—are similar: high-
investment industries would tend to reduce investment more
Chart 4
Industry Investment Rates: 1997-98 Change in Rate 
Compared with 1993-97 Average Rate 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
Haver Analytics; author’s calculations. 
Note: TCU is transportation, communications, and utilities; FIRE is finance, 
insurance, and real estate.
1997-98 change in rate (percent)


















Industry Investment Rates: 2000-01 Change in Rate 
Compared with 1996-2000 Average Rate
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
Haver Analytics; author’s calculations.
Note: TCU is transportation, communications, and utilities; FIRE is finance, 
insurance, and real estate.
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5 15 20 35 40in a recession.Therefore,it is reasonable to conclude that the
excessive optimism of the late 1990s may have sown the
seeds of the investment bust of 2001 and possibly the most
recent downturn.
Conclusion
Our examination of investment patterns across equipment
and industries suggests that investment in information tech-
nology,particularly in communications equipment,was a
major factor in the investment boom and bust.The equip-
ment investment patterns point to Y2K and the Internet 
bubble as important players in the boom and bust,19 while
industry trends indicate that investment by the telephone
industry had a sizable influence on aggregate investment.
More generally,the widespread increases in investment
rates across industries during the boom suggest that macro-
economic factors—such as strong aggregate GDP growth—
were major contributors to the boom.In contrast,during the
bust,investment rates were found to decline more sharply in
industries that previously had shown high investment rates.
Two alternative conclusions could be drawn from this find-
ing: high-investment industries curtailed their investment
during the bust to compensate for their overexuberance dur-
ing the boom,or these industries lowered their future profit
expectations more sharply than did other industries. In
either case,the 2001 investment bust and possibly the recent
recession could be at least partially attributable to the exces-
sive optimism displayed by investing firms in the late 1990s.
A final observation is that our findings shed only some
light on the patterns underlying the investment boom and
bust.One prominent issue outstanding is the role of large
fluctuations in stock prices during the period. McCarthy
(2001),for example,concludes that equity price fluctuations
could not explain the boom and bust.20 Nevertheless,indus-
tries with better performing stock may have secured financ-
ing for capital spending more easily during the late 1990s.
Conversely, large declines in stock prices likely made the
financing of capital purchases more difficult in some indus-
tries.Unresolved issues such as this one indicate that the
recent patterns of investment spending will continue to
inspire lively debate.
Notes
1. For example, the Federal Reserve’s “Monetary Policy Report to the
Congress,” submitted February 27, 2002, notes: “The boom in capital outlays
that had helped drive the expansion through the late 1990s gave way to a soft-
ening of spending in late 2000 and to sharp declines [in 2001]. Spending
dropped for most types of capital equipment and structures: cutbacks were
especially severe for high-tech equipment, some types of which may have been
overbought.”
2. See, for instance, Wall Street Journal (2000).
3. Krugman (2002), for example, observes: “The key point is that this isn’t your
father’s recession—it’s your grandfather’s recession. . . . It’s a classic overinvest-
ment slump, of a kind that was normal before World War II.”
4. This calculation relies on data from the Fixed Assets Database, compiled 
by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis and avail-
able at <http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/faweb/details/index.html>.
5. For example, see Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999, 2000), Oliner and Sichel
(2000), and Stiroh (2001a, 2001b). However, a rising capital stock does not suf-
ficiently explain stronger trend productivity growth. For instance, capital stock
growth in the 1970s was as high or higher than it was during the 1990s, but
trend productivity declined in the 1970s.
6. The exact formula used to calculate growth contributions is drawn from
Moulton and Seskin (1999) and Whelan (2000).
7. When an aggregate is measured in chain-weighted dollars, as it is in the U.S.
National Income and Product Accounts, its components do not add up to the
aggregate level. Thus, it can be difficult to assess the contributions of the com-
ponents. This problem becomes particularly severe when the relative prices of
some components change considerably—a relevant consideration for invest-
ment because computer prices have dropped dramatically over the years (see
Steindel [1995] and Whelan [2000]). In contrast to the component levels,
growth contributions do sum to the aggregate’s growth rate.
8. Because components of a nominal aggregate do add up, all shares are
expressed as a percentage of nominal investment.
9. McCarthy (2001) observes that the investment decline of 2001 was broadly
based.
10. The industry data are from the Fixed Assets Database of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (<http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/faweb/details/index.html>).
Because the aggregate investment rate is a ratio of two chain-aggregated real
variables, we cannot calculate a sensible estimate of it simply by dividing aggre-
gate investment by the aggregate capital stock. Instead, as in Whelan (2000), we
compute investment rates using the detailed data (by industry and by type),
aggregating the individual investment rates by type using each type’s share of
current-cost capital stock in the industry. Note that industry investment and
capital stock data are available only through 2001.
11. Complete details of this calculation are available from the author at
<jonathan.mccarthy@ny.frb.org>.
12. McCarthy (2003) finds large capital overhangs in communications equip-
ment and in communications industries in 2000-01, and observes that they were
largely worked off in 2002-03. French, Klier, and Oppedahl (2002) discuss the
existence of capital overhangs in telecommunications, although their evidence
pertains only to total capital (equipment and structures).
13. An examination of any of the boom years around 1998 would yield a similar
conclusion.
14. Our industry sample excludes agriculture, mining, and construction because
these industries had minor roles in the boom and bust.
15. This is one conclusion from McCarthy (2001).
16. The trend line takes into account industry size, as measured by GDP share.
The estimated slope of the trend line is -0.266, with a standard error of 0.043; the
R2 of the regression is 0.403. Weighting has little effect: in a simple unweighted
regression, the slope is estimated to be -0.252, with a standard error of 0.044; the
R2is 0.402.
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17. We repeated the analysis for the years prior to the most recent boom and
bust. The pattern in most expansion years is similar to that of 1998; that is to say,
there is little pattern. In contrast, many recession years display a negative pattern
similar to that of 2001, although the pattern is not as stark as that of 2001.
18. Charts and regressions on this relationship are available from the author at
<jonathan.mccarthy@ny.frb.org>.
19. This disaggregated view also attaches somewhat greater importance to Y2K
than does Kliesen (2003), who finds relatively modest Y2K effects on aggregate
investment and investment in information equipment and software.
20. Specifically, McCarthy finds that Tobin’s q, through which stock prices
should affect capital spending, has only a small effect on aggregate investment
spending once the influence of variables such as GDP growth is taken into
account.
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